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Abstract: 
The paper, as a historical insight in the development of views about the place of humanity in 
the universe, discusses the relevance of patristic thought, in particular the ideas of the 7th 
century’s  Byzantine monk-theologian Maximus the Confessor, for modern cosmology. It is 
argued that patristic ideas on the central position of humanity in the universe and the 
possibility of its knowledge remain relevant for modern cosmology which, in a way, allows 
one to elucidate old philosophical ideas. The modern scientific claim on the power of 
humanity to articulate the universe as a whole is compared with Maximus’ ideas on grasping 
the sense of creation through the God-given ability.  
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Резюме 
В статье, как историческом свидетельстве о развитии взглядов о месте человека во 
вселенной, обсуждается связь идей греческой патристики, в частности византийского 
монаха-богослова Максима Исповедника, с современной космологией. Показывается, 
что представления патристики о центральном положении человека в творении и сама 
возможность его познания, сохраняют свою актуальность в контексте  современной 
космологии, которая по сути позволяет прояснить взгляды античных мыслителей. 
Уверенность современной космологии в том, что человек в силах артикулировать 
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вселенную в целом, используя научные методы, анализируется в контексте идей 




In view of persistent claims of some 
modern scientists that the success of 
cosmology brings to light the ultimate 
frontiers of human knowledge, the aim of 
this paper is to attempt to understand the 
sense of cosmology in view of historical 
development of human thought by 
demonstrating that cosmology reproduces 
in many of its aspects perennial puzzles 
related to human existence in the universe. 
In a way this paper exercises that which 
can be called philosophical commitment, 
that is the commitment to understand the 
existential sense of the universe, or, to be 
more precise, to “understand” what it 
means to think of or commune with the 
universe. What could it mean the thinking 
of or communion with the universe in the 
conditions of a scientific and technological 
age in order to avoid this thinking being 
enslaved by the sphere where knowledge is 
operated according to some social, but still 
historically contingent standards? 
Correspondingly, how could we dress this 
thinking in words while avoiding all 
cultural superstitions which engulf our 
language? And even in the case where we 
believed that we have achieved such a 
goal, could we expect any recognition of 
that form of thinking which intentionally 
extends beyond the view of the universe 
which is framed by varieties of scientific 
projects, conference discussions and 
numerous publications? All these 
questions implicitly presuppose that the 
scientific way of thinking of the universe  
does not cover the fullness of our 
communion with the universe which is 
concealed in the very fact of our existence. 
This concealment follows, for example, 
from the fact that humanity is able to 
interact not only with the physical world of 
corporeal objects, but also with the realm 
of intelligible forms, to which cosmology 
can attest only indirectly. To think of the 
universe is thus to explicate the sense of 
the universe on existential grounds, where 
our understanding of the adjective 
“existential” follows from the sense which 
was asserted by existentialists in the 20th 
century, namely, that human life and 
existence is the primary and 
unquestionable metaphysical fact from 
which the whole reality is unfolded. 
Thinking of the universe in existential 
categories thus implies the extended vision 
and perception of the universe, which, in 
words of a 7th century Byzantine monk-
theologian Maximus the Confessor, is the 
makro-anthropos, that is that which was 
created in order to be humanised.    
 
 To think of the universe on the 
grounds of existential communion entails 
freedom of such thinking. It does not 
necessarily imply the overthrowing of 
scientific authority in the questions of 
physical cosmology: it implies that 
cosmological theories and hypotheses can 
be interpreted not as propositions about 
outer realities but as movements of the 
human heart and spirit which reflect a 
fundamental anxiety of existence. In this 
case the universe is perceived as a  certain 
whole, whose partial phenomenality is 
explicated by science. This whole includes 
not only the physically fragmented or 
united cosmos, but it includes the infinity 
of human life (the infinity of relations of 
human beings to created existents) in the 
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universe. Correspondingly all accumulated 
forms of knowledge, established in history 
to this very date, are merely pieces and 
moments, temporary and provisional 
sketches of the immensely mysterious 
phenomenon of personal beings. The “non-
technlogical” thinking of the universe, 
even if it will not be able to reproduce this 
“whole of the universe” (which was, 
however, attempted in works of art and 
poetry) and hence will remain no more 
than a symbol rather than reality, can 
receive its justification in a deep hope, that 
through this thinking we learn something 
of ourselves which has never been present 
in our vision of all.  Being an intentional 
thinking, thinking of the universe as a 
whole brings that one who thinks beyond 
any conditional objectification  and 
positivity which could seem as that which 
fulfils this thinking. In a way, thinking of 
the universe is transcending the limits of 
thought at all which   requires from the 
enquirer exceptional discipline, courage 
and humility in front of the fact that the 
task will never be fulfilled and that they  
are ready to learn of themselves something 
which could shatter the image of their own 
“I”.  
 
 By thinking of the universe as a 
whole, we attempt to explicate our 
intrinsically ambivalent existential 
situation, being a part of the universe, in its 
particular time and space, and at the same 
time being at “that” paradoxically central 
“nowhere” from which the wholeness of 
the universe is unfolded. Some 
cosmologists can object to this by saying 
that in terms of time we are living in a very 
special era in the universe, that it is only 
now that it is possible to detect the 
universe’s evolution, its origin in the Big 
Bang etc. The universe as described by 
specific cosmological theories is not 
contingent from the point of view of these 
models. However, from the point of view 
of the very possibility of such a 
description, that is from the point of view 
of the contingent facticity of life of 
knowing persons, it is still contingent. The 
pole of “nowhere” remains intact simply 
because cosmology, which deals with the 
physical background for existence of 
embodied human persons (that is, its 
necessary conditions) is not able to shed 
the light on the nature of the sufficient 
conditions of existence of intelligent 
observers and theoreticians of  the 
universe. Being engaged in thinking of the 
universe as a whole we are immersed not 
so much into the present of the scientific 
discourse of the universe but into the 
present of thinking itself.  And this present 
is dictated not only by  the advance of 
contemporary physical theories of the 
universe but to a great extent by the 
advance of thinking per se, that is its free 
philosophical mode which is not subjected 
to the logic of the already known but 
follows that which Husserl  called 
humanity’s “infinite tasks”. Here it is 
appropriate to quote K. Jaspers, rephrasing 
a little his text, that our historical 
consciousness of the universe, in spite of 
being a temporal phenomenon, is a “free-
flying” consciousness without “any ground 
and original point  accessible to 
knowledge, ultimately rooted  in that  
source which is always and necessarily 
present in ourselves” (Jaspers 1982, s. 77). 
This type of thinking, flying away from 
mundane realities and technological 
delimiters, will reveal deeper and clearer 
the fact of our, as Heidegger termed it,  
“planetary homelessness” (but still 
centrality) which pertains to the present 
intellectual, social and political 
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unpredictability of the human condition.  
One must, perhaps, amplify this point by 
using the term “cosmic homelessness” 
implying the lack of understanding of the 
human place in the whole universe. We are 
homeless because the universe is infinite, 
and in spite of some claims of our 
centrality in the universe, we still do not 
know our place in it, that is we do not 
know scientifically the grounds of our 
facticity in it. What we know for sure, 
however, is  that it is us who articulate the 
universe, so that, perhaps, as some claim, 
we are in the centre of the universe, but the 
question of “where” this very centre 
ultimately is, remains in the field of 
perennial certitudes négatives.  
 
 While Jaspers could say that the 
realisation of “cosmic homelessness” (as 
the denial of the historical consciousness) 
becomes “the metaphysical consciousness 
of being (Sein), which being constantly 
present, must become evident in true being 
(Dasein), as if in eternally present” (Ibid.), 
according to Heidegger, our “cosmic  
homelessness”, that is inability to answer 
questions about own essence,  drops a 
shadow of doubt with regard to being of 
the universe itself (our “cosmic 
homelessness” can be qualified as non-
being).1 Then it is from this perspective of 
our own finitude, mortality, non-
attunement to  and incommensurability 
with the universe  that one must have the 
courage  to think of the universe in order to 
assert ourselves. However this assertion of 
ourselves has a particular spiritual 
importance only for those who still value 
the humanity of the humans, naturalness of 
nature, justice of the police, and other 
perennial  values which crown man in the 
centre of the world, for whom this world is 
given to fulfil the “infinite” task of finding 
its destiny in the union with the underlying 
foundation of the universe.  
 
It is not difficult to see that 
thinking of the universe as if we think of 
the thinking itself at present, allows one to 
establish certain articulations of the overall 
temporal span of the universe, its past, 
present and future in conscious acts which 
fight oblivion which pertains to the eternal 
flux of being. When articulated, the 
universe is being remembered not only as 
its realised past. The question of active 
remembrance of the universe, is the 
question of such an understanding of 
human life in which past, present and 
future are not considered anymore as signs 
of the all-annihilating Kronos, but as being 
able to be integrated through remembrance 
in the image of humanity living in tension 
between a thanksgiving for existence and a 
hope for its non-transient sense.2 To study 
the universe does not mean  to establish a 
simple vision of the world on the grounds 
of mundane curiosity or personal needs. It 
rather forms a vision of that “selfhood” of 
the universe (as the makro-anthropos) 
which is truly important for one’s 
existence and which brings to 
unconcealment  the truth of the human 
existence. When we speak of the “self” of 
the universe, we do not presume that it 
does have personal  features but, 
allegorically speaking, humanity by 
looking at the “face” of the universe, sees 
this “face” as looking at themselves, and it 
is this all-penetrating “glance” of the 
makro-anthropos that forms the image of 
humanity as its ability to see the infinite in 
the finite. In a certain sense human beings, 
as they are sustained by this last mentioned 
glance, want to respond to it thus asserting 
not only their longing for the 
commensurability with the universe, but 
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also their infinitely transcending lordship 
over the universe resisting their 
cosmographic insignificance and a fear of 
being crushed under the weight of 
astronomical facts. Pascal compared man 
with reed, thinking reed, in the universe, 
the weakest but thinking element in the 
chain of being, so that a drop of water can 
kill a man and the universe does not need 
to arm itself in order to crush man. “But 
even if the universe should crush him, man 
still would be more noble than that which 
kills him, since he knows he is mortal, and 
knows that the universe is more powerful 
than he is: but the universe itself knows 
nothing of it. All our dignity, then consists 
in thought. It is through thought  alone that  
we have to lift ourselves up, and not 
through space or time which we cannot 
fill.”3   
 
The vision of the universe along 
the lines just formulated above definitely 
transcends the scope of science. Its sense is 
the acquisition of those ways of thought 
which have already been exercised by 
many great thinkers before the era of 
scientific cosmology has come. What was 
typical to them is the integral vision  of the 
universe in the context of human life and 
not vice versa, that is positioning human 
life in the background of the vast cosmos. 
The existential issue was to make the sense 
of the universe through establishing the 
sense of life. Correspondingly the vision of 
the universe was sometimes very 
imaginative and committed to a certain 
faith in existence of the ultimate 
foundation and sense of existence. 
Interestingly enough is that such a vision, 
being imbued with spiritual and existential 
motives, was not eliminated at all through 
the development of modern cosmology. 
Om the contrary the existential sense of 
modern cosmology can be elucidated by 
re-invoking the old but never outdated  
themes making the sense of the universe to 
be comprehensible only from within the 
history of humanity. This is the reason 
why, as a matter of a historical analogy 
and as a case study, we undertake in this 
paper a hermeneutical analysis of some 
modern cosmological ideas about the 
universe and humanity in it through 
reading a 7th century Byzantine theologian, 
nowadays   a Saint, Maximus the 
Confessor, who is often quoted in 
historical studies on Patristics and its 
cosmic dimension.  
 
Maximus the Confessor and his 
“cosmology” 
 
Maximus the Confessor lived his human 
life fourteen hundred years ago in a 
cultural and social environment 
considerably different from what we have 
today. Having been imbued with the Greek  
philosophy originating from pre-Christian 
times, he (as well as the Church Fathers 
before him) must have inherited the picture 
of the physical world based in the 
Aristotelean philosophy and Ptolemy’s (2nd 
century BC) astronomy in which the 
cosmos was presented by a system of the 
heavenly spheres, bearing the moon, five 
planets and the sun, rotating around their 
geometrical and ontological, immovable 
centre with  the  earth. The cosmos was 
finite and concluded by the sphere of 
immovable stars, a boundary of the 
universe, beyond which was a mysterious 
nowhere.   We cannot  say with certainty 
how much of this ancient astronomy was 
known to Maximus. He probably was not 
concerned too much with knowledge of the 
world per se and cosmos did not have the 
same importance for Maximus as for the 
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pagan philosophers. Correspondingly 
when one invokes the term “cosmology”, 
“cosmos”, “cosmic vision”, “cosmic 
liturgy”, “Christocentric cosmology” etc., 
reflecting  in the context of Maximus’ 
writings that often claimed “cosmic 
dimension” of Greek Patristic or Orthodox 
theology, these cosmic connotations are 
not those which were meant by the ancient 
Greek philosophers and certainly not by 
modern physical cosmology. One could 
suggest, hypothetically, that Maximus 
could have been interested in reconciling 
the ancient Greek cosmology with that of 
the Genesis of the Bible which does not 
have any indication of the spherically 
structured universe with the centre at the 
spherical Earth. However, we cannot find 
any direct references to this in the   
writings of Maximus; unlike his 
predecessors  Basil the Great and Gregory 
of Nyssa, Maximus did not produce his 
own explicit “Hexameron”. One can add to 
this that the perception of the finitude of 
the spatial dimensions of the natural world 
following from Ptolemaic cosmology must 
have been complemented by the perception 
of the finitude in duration of the world that  
followed from Biblical teaching.  Maximus 
probably thought of the universe as being 
few thousands years old after the time it 
was created.  However, this cosmographic, 
or, so to speak, natural finitude was 
inherent in Maximus’ thought not only 
because of astronomical ideas and Biblical 
tradition;  for Maximus as a philosopher, 
space and time were finite first of all on 
the grounds of their epistemological 
understanding as expressions of finitude 
and limitations in general. For example, 
temporality is a characteristic of the finite 
creation related to all things: 
“…everything is certainly in time, since 
everything that possesses existence after 
God possesses this existence in a certain 
way and not simply. And therefore they 
are not without beginning.  For if we know 
how something is, we may know that it is, 
but not that it [always] was.”4 In other 
words, the universe cannot be infinite in 
time and space because it was created out 
of nothing, so that its hypothetical 
infinitude would contradict its created 
nature. In this sense the notions of infinite 
space and endless time are contradictory as 
being a mixture of that which is supposed 
be uncreated (the infinite) and created 
(which is always given in rubrics of 
limited spatiality and limited movement 
(temporality)).  Time and space [place] in 
Maximus exist simultaneously and cannot 
exist without each other: there is a 
common source of their contingent 
facticity in their otherness.5 Contemporary 
cosmology would agree on the interlink 
between space and time based in general 
relativity; however, space and time in 
physics are relational upon created matter 
whereas in Maximus this relationality is 
linked to the conditions of creation in 
general between the ultimate causation of 
the world and its final consummation. In 
this sense space and time are not only 
forms of the world’s finitude, but also the 
conditions of the Divine presence in the 
world.  
 
 Modern cosmology would be in a 
partial agreement with what concerns the 
finite past of the universe, whereas the 
same cosmology asserts the indefinite 
accelerating expansion of the universe in 
the future. In terms of space it is 
understood that  the visible part of the 
universe is limited because of the 
conditions of observation, but not because 
of any philosophical assumption.6 Whether 
or not the universe is spatially infinite 
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beyond the visible universe, remains a 
theoretical conviction. In spite of the 
conviction that allows for the universe to 
be potentially geometrically infinite, the 
point of view of  Maximus can be valid if 
we restrict ourselves to the epistemological 
finitude which follows from the creaturely 
nature of the universe.  
 
 From what we have said so far it 
follows that Maximus’ thought is not 
irrelevant and can be engaged with modern 
cosmology; however, the term 
“cosmology” which is used in the 
scholarly studies of Maximus must be 
carefully elucidated. Cosmology in 
Maximus is related either to the created 
world as a whole with its generic 
ontological structure, or to the very “act” 
of creation of the world out of nothing, in 
“which” the wholeness of the world is 
represented in an encapsulated form. 
Cosmology in Maximus is related to the 
constitution of the created world, for 
example, as the distinction and difference 
(diaphora) between the visible and 
invisible (sensible and intelligible) realm 
in creation. Cosmology in Maximus is 
realistic in the sense that Maximus does 
not enquire into the conditions of the very 
possibility of constituting the world. From 
a modern philosophical point of view this 
cosmology is based on the presumption of 
faith in those realities which are posed by 
human subject as ontological ones. The 
access to the universe is guaranteed by the 
acceptance of the fact of life as that 
saturated givenness in the human Divine 
image which cannot be denied. In other 
words, a realistic stance in anthropology 
connotes with a realistic stance in 
cosmology: anthropology mimics the same 
basic differences in creation and 
legitimises, on the grounds of the analogy, 
the process of knowledge and 
understanding of the universe. It is through 
theological anthropology that the Christian 
dimensions enter cosmological 
considerations and, vice versa, Christian 
teaching receives its cosmological sense. 
However, all these aspects of the so called 
“theological cosmology” can be related to 
cosmology understood as the science of 
the physical universe only to a very limited 
extent.  Then it becomes clear that the 
issue of discussing the legacy of Maximus 
the Confessor in the context of modern 
cosmology presupposes a different level of 
enquiry, which brings both Maximus’ 
teaching and the modern view of the 
universe to the common “denominator”, 
humanity itself, understood not through its 
cosmically insignificant position portrayed 
by physical cosmology, but through its 
central place in creation being a centre of 
disclosure and manifestation of the 
universe originating in its Divine image.   
 
 Another dimension of Maximus’ 
legacy in the context of modern cosmology 
arrives from an observation that studying 
and thinking of  Maximus in the 21st 
century is not so much  studying facts and 
models of physical reality. It is rather 
studying and learning his ways of thought. 
As was asserted by G. Florovsky, to study 
the Fathers of the Church is, first of all, to 
“acquire their mind” to learn how to think 
of the world  through the eyes of faith in 
God in order to discover this world as 
being rooted in God. In other words, how 
to see the reality of the world in its 
intimate link to its creator, to approach life 
in the universe in its God-given integrity 
and communion and to see the presence of 
that God’s reality in every aspect of the 
human wonder of the world, every 
scientifically articulated fact.  In this sense 
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the cosmic vision  of Maximus the 
Confessor is interesting not in terms of its  
physical aspects, but in terms of its impact 
on the understanding of divine humanity 
and its central role in articulating the 
universe. Maximus’ vision of the universe 
teaches us how to withstand the attacks of 
the exterior sense  impressions and the lure 
of the aesthetic artefacts of scientific 
theories in order to preserve our human 
dignity, to preserve humanity at all costs 
and not be swallowed by the immensities 
of the “beautiful universe”, or, as it was 
said by G. Marcel in the middle of the 20th 
century,   not to be crushed under the 
weight of astronomical facts. 
 
 Contemporary scientific vision of 
reality condemns humanity to physical 
slavery, its consubstantiality to the tiny 
portion of the material stuff in the 
universe. In this sense physics is immanent 
and monistic: it chains us to the world and 
its necessities which follow from physical 
laws. It disregards  those dimensions of 
personal existence which deviate from the 
phenomenality of objects. The value of 
Maximus’ thought comes from the exactly 
opposite move: he teaches us of how to 
transcend this phenomenality. When we 
say “transcend” it does not mean that we 
pass the universe over, leave it behind, and 
aspire to God, the transcendent. “To 
transcend” in this case means to preserve 
our difference and distinction from within  
the universe, to retain personhood and our 
divine image even in those conditions, 
when science positions us in the universe 
as a “virtually non-existent, dust”. “To 
transcend” means to be able, while 
studying the universe, to develop the 
“inner kingdom” of the human heart, 
which, being conditioned by the 
necessities of embodiment in the universe, 
still retain the faculty of communion with 
the source and giver of life.   In this sense, 
the cosmic vision of Maximus the 
Confessor is never dated and outdated, 
because it teaches us how to increase our 
faith in God through studying the universe 
and then withdrawing from it. This latter 
thought corresponds to a 
phenomenological attitude to cosmology, 
namely that cosmology speaks not only 
about outer physical realities. Its theories 
attest to the structures of human 
subjectivity, that is to the structures of 
disclosure  and manifestation which reflect 
the search of humanity for the sense of its 
own existence.7  It is through this search 
that cosmology advances the sense of 
personhood as a radically different state of 
being, different from all non-hypostatic 
entities which cosmology predicates. It is 
through this ever unfolded sense of 
personhood that the reality  of the Divine 
Personhood manifests itself with an ever 
unceasing force.  
 
Creatio ex nihilo in Maximus the 
Confessor and modern cosmology 
 
There is no need to speak at length about 
one of the major elements of the Christian 
teaching, namely the affirmation that the 
world was created by God out of nothing. 
Maximus predecessor’s Basil the Great 
and Augustine asserted this differently. 
Basil the Great, in his Hexaemeron  made 
a distinction between creation of the 
intelligible world with no temporal flux 
and no spatial dimension, and the creation 
of the visible universe together with “the 
succession of time, for ever passing on and 
passing away and never stopping in its 
course.” 8 Basil asserts that the meaning of 
the Biblical phrase “In the beginning God 
created” must be understood as “in the 
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beginning of time” (Ibid., p. 55), that is 
God created the visible world together 
with time, and it was the beginning of time 
in the visible world9. In order to articulate 
the a-temporal nature of “the beginning of 
the world”, and to remove any causation at 
the beginning in terms of time-series, Basil 
affirms that “the beginning, in effect, is 
indivisible and instantaneous...the 
beginning of time is not yet time and not 
even the least particle of it” (Ibid). 
Augustine in Confessions, XI addressed 
the problem of the origin of time directly, 
affirming similarly to Basil, that: “The 
way, God, in which you made heaven and 
earth was not that you made them either in 
heaven or on earth....Nor did you make the 
universe within the framework of the 
universe. There was nowhere for it to be 
made before it was brought into 
existence”10; the universe was not created 
by God in time, but was created with 
time11. Augustine affirmed the creation of 
the universe and time within it as the only 
consistent expression of the Christian 
affirmation of creatio ex nihilo. The nihilo 
could not be something, it could not have 
any attributes of created things, it must be 
an absolute philosophical no-thing.  
 
 Maximus the Confessor, following 
his predecessors, repeats that the world 
was created out of nothing because of 
God’s will and goodness, by his Wisdom 
and Logos. The createdness of the word 
implies its non-eternity and consequently 
its beginning in time. However, in spite of 
that this beginning in time can be 
understood only from within the already 
created world (according to Augustine this 
cannot be a “beginning” as if it would be 
seen outside the world), Maximus points to 
a difficulty that can arise. One reads a 
passage from his Centuries on Charity 4.3: 
“God, who is eternally Creator, creates 
when He wills by His consubstantial Word 
and Spirit, because of His infinite 
goodness.” This is a general statement 
which does not raise any questions because 
this is a matter of religious conviction. 
Then Maximus anticipates a possible 
question on details of this creation of the 
world: “Nor must you object: Why did He 
create at a certain time since He was 
always good?” Here the question is 
formulated from within those categories of 
sequence and time which pertain to the 
already created world. Indeed, if the 
creation of the world happened several 
thousand years ago measured by the 
created time, why this age of the world is 
such as it is; in other  words, can we 
enquire into the nature of this age’s 
contingent facticity as it is contemplated 
from within creation? Maximus gives a 
characteristic response - “no”: “The 
unsearchable wisdom of the infinite 
essence does not fall under human 
knowledge.” 12   It is impossible to 
transcend the boundaries of the created and 
to enquire into its facticity on the grounds 
of the impossibility of knowing the divine 
volitions and intentions; creation with its 
scecific and contingent features remains a 
divine mystery connected with the divine 
providence. This response has  general 
apophatic overtones related to the 
unknowability of God. 13 
 
 However, one must analyse further 
some implications of the question, 
discussed by Maximus. If the question 
about “when” of creation is related to the 
temporal span of the physical universe 
seen from within this universe then one 
can find parallels with contemporary 
cosmology. Formally,  Maximus’ question 
can be translated by using modern 
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cosmological language into a question 
about the initial conditions of the universe 
which fix its physical parameters, 
including its age. But physical cosmology 
cannot give an account of the initial 
conditions for dynamical laws which  drive 
matter and space of the universe. 
Correspondingly cosmology cannot 
provide a clear explanation why the age of 
the visible universe is 13.7 billion years. 
Since we can speculate on the nature of the 
initial conditions only from within our 
universe by extrapolating backward the 
properties of the observable universe, the 
‘knowledge’ of the initial conditions thus 
achieved does not tell us anything about 
these conditions, as if there were special 
trans-worldly physical laws responsible for 
these conditions as the outcomes of these 
laws.14 Being bounded by the universe one 
cannot know the “laws” of the initial 
conditions of the universe as if they could 
be attested from beyond the universe (we 
can only postulate them). In this sense 
Maximus’ response “no” with respect to 
the initial conditions of the created 
universe exactly corresponds to “no” of 
scientific cosmology in respect to the 
initial conditions which fix the contingent 
facticity of the universe.   
 
However, Maximus’s question about 
“when” of creation can be posed and 
reformulated differently as if the universe 
appeared out of something preexistent. 
One can imagine a pre-existent space-time 
continuum in which our universe appears 
at some “moment” and “location” in this 
pre-existent continuum. Then the question 
“when” of creation will have another sense 
as a particular “when” of pre-existent time. 
We are not concerned here with the nature 
of this preexistence, that is whether it is 
related to the multiverse, or something 
“before” the Big Bang, or to a cycling 
universe of Penrose’s type. What interests 
us is a possibility to approach creation as 
an “object”, as a transition from something 
“before” to that which is here and now. 
This would be typical for the natural 
attitude to “look at” the creation and ask a 
question on the specificity of this or that 
“moment” of its happening in the 
preexistent scheme of things. Certainly one 
could refer to Augustine’s ways of 
responding to such a question simply 
pointing to the fact that “before” the world 
was created no entities such as all-
embracing space or time could exist. Such 
an Augustinian response is true in its 
philosophical essence, but it would be 
useful to confirm this truth through a 
negative assessment of modern models of 
creation with preexistent space-time. 
Indeed to ask why creation “now” but not 
later or before, would imply the possibility 
of approaching the creation in the objective 
scheme of things, that is to position it as an 
“event”, as a particular happening in the 
series of causations.15 
  
 As an example of “creation” in 
preexistent space time one can consider a  
model  of “creation” of matter in the 
universe (not space and time) from the 
initial state with the total energy of matter 
equal zero.  This requirement can be 
treated as a meta-law, imposed on matter 
of the future universe in the pre-existent 
space and time. Such a model was offered 
by Tryon 16 . The major feature of this 
model is that the universe originates in 
preexistent space and time as a result of a 
fluctuation in the physical vacuum (a 
physical state of quantum matter in which 
the values of all observables of particles 
are zero). Geometrically the development 
of such a universe can be presented as a 
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future light cone, whose apex is positioned 
completely arbitrarily in preexistent space 
and time (see Fig. 1). It is exactly this 
arbitrariness of the “place” and “moment” 
of origination of the visible universe in the 
background of the preexistent space and 
time, which constitutes a difficulty similar 
to that of Maximus: it is impossible to 
specify and justify why the universe 
originated at a specific point of space and 
time (that is it is impossible to specify 
“when” of this origination). In this theory 
the spontaneous creation of the universe  
could occur anywhere and at any moment 
of pre-existent space and time. (A variety 
of different universes could originate at 
different locations of the preexistent space-
time, driving cosmology to face a serious 
problem of the mutual influence of 
different universes; see Fig. 1.)  
 
 
Correspondingly the question of  “when” 
of “creation” not only cannot be answered, 
but, in fact, does not have any sense, for if 
the preexistent space-time is infinite, an 
infinite time could have passed since our 
universe originated. But this makes the 
question of temporality of the moment of 
creation devoid of any meaning. 17  
Similarly the question of a spatial location 
of such an origin in pre-existent space does 
not have any sense.18 There is no need to 
argue that this kind of model has nothing 
to do with creation out of nothing in a 
theological sense, for space, time, the 
meta-law, and the quantum vacuum are all 
assumed to be pre-existent. It is reasonable 
to talk about the temporal origination of 
the material universe rather than about its 
creation out of nothing.19   
 
 The beginning of the world and its 
created temporality can be grasped from 
within the world, so that this beginning is 
the constituted beginning from within the 
world.  No constitution or objectivisation 
of this beginning is possible from beyond 
the world, because this “beyond the world” 
is not an “object” but rather the condition 
of the very possibility for the world to be 
manifested to and articulated by human 
beings. In this sense the quest for the 
beginning of the created universe reveals 
itself as a quest for the limits of human 
consciousness attempting to grasp the 
facticity of the world.  
 
 What is interesting is that the 
refutation of models of “creation” of the 
universe in preexistent space-time leads us 
to further clarification of what is meant by 
creation in theology.  Indeed, the logical 
difficulty of models with pre-existent 
space and time is connected with the 
inability to locate the moment of time and 
place in space where the universe 
originated, from outside, by transcending 
beyond the universe itself, into its 
imaginable preexistent “before”. One can 
argue about the beginning of time within 
the visible universe by extrapolating its 
expansion backward in time. But this will 
never allow one to claim scientifically that 
there either was or was not pre-existent 
time “before” our universe came into 
existence. The situation was described by 
Kant in terms of his first cosmological 
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antinomy as a logical tension between the 
thesis, that the world has a beginning in 
time and is also limited as regards space, 
and the antithesis, that the world has no 
beginning and no limits in space; it is 
infinite as regards both time and space. 20 
 
 The abovementioned antinomy 
which arises in cosmology with pre-
existent space and time can be considered 
from a different perspective, without any 
reference to space and time, which brings 
us even closer to the thinking of Maximus 
the Confessor.  For example, the thesis can 
be treated as the affirmation that the visible 
universe is unique and finite as regards 
space and time, whereas the antithesis is 
that the visible universe, being finite in 
terms of its temporal past, is one particular 
representative out of the ensemble of 
universes with different boundary 
conditions (corresponding, in the previous 
logic, to different moments of their 
origination in preexistent time). The 
plurality of different boundary conditions 
corresponds to the logical multitude of a 
Platonic-like kind, so that the antinomial 
nature of any predication on the 
uniqueness or not of these conditions 
becomes evident because the ontological 
status of that which is predicated in thesis 
and antithesis is different: while with 
respect to the visible universe we can make 
an empirical inference, an  assumption that 
there is an ensemble of universes, which 
we cannot verify empirically, requires an 
intellectual inference, that is the reference 
to the  realm of the intelligible. In this case 
the whole meaning of the antinomy reveals 
itself as predication about two 
ontologically distinct realities, that is the 
empirical visible universe and the Platonic-
like ensemble of the universes. If we 
extrapolate this reasoning back to the 
problem, discussed by Maximus the 
Confessor, the question posed by him in 
the Centuries on Charity 4.3 must be 
transformed in such a way that the 
temporal aspect of the specificity of the 
creation of the world is replaced by the 
aspect of “choice” of this particular world 
out of many potential possible worlds, 
namely “Why did God choose to create 
this world but not the other?” (See Fig. 
2).21  
 
To tackle this issue Maximus introduced 
different arguments. 
 
The Origin of the Universe and the logoi 
of Creation  
 
In Ambigua 7 Maximus states that “the 
logoi of all things known by God before 
their creation are securely fixed in God.… 
Yet all these things, things present and 
things to come, have not been brought into 
being contemporaneously with their being 
known by God; rather each was created in 
appropriate way according to its logos at 
the proper time according to the wisdom of 
the maker….” 22  He makes a distinction 
between knowledge of things by God in 
their logoi and their actual coming into 
being.  Knowledge of things even if they 
are known eternally does not imply the 
necessity of their existence as created. 
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There is an ontological 
incommensurability between things known 
by God as potentially existent and those 
which were brought into being. If one 
applies this  thought to the universe as a 
whole, one can suggest that the knowledge 
by God of this universe with a potential to 
become created does not necessarily imply 
its creation. There is a gap in the 
necessitation between knowledge and 
actual creation which is  based, according 
to Maximus, in the Divine wisdom and 
will and which not only brings all things 
into existence at their proper time, but 
ultimately brings the actually existing 
world as a whole into existence. The words 
of Maximus related to the wisdom of the 
Creator with regard to the “determination” 
of a proper moment of creation can be, by 
a matter of philosophical suggestion, 
applied to the “determination of the 
choice” of the world as such, or, in 
cosmological phraseology, the choice of 
the world with those boundary conditions 
which led to the actual display of the 
universe. Then the question is: “Could God 
know not only of this world which he has 
actually created, but other potential worlds 
which either have not been created  at all, 
or have been created in  a different mode 
of being?” If the answer is yes, then we 
must suppose that  just as God applied his 
wisdom for creating this world, he must 
have been wise of not creating other 
worlds, or creating them in a different 
mode of being. This wisdom reveals itself 
through God’s will to make a choice in the 
actual creation of this world. 
Correspondingly all other worlds, being 
only potential possibilities either remained 
as such, or they were implanted in 
creation, for example, as intelligible 
entities with the logoi not to acquire any 
corporeal shape, remaining the images and  
prints of the divine wisdom accessible to 
an intellectual search and contemplation. 
In this sense the very idea of the variety of 
the “boundary” conditions for the created 
world manifests itself as a pointer, a 
paradeigmata, towards the detection  of 
the divine wisdom. If our way of 
extrapolating Maximus’ thought is correct, 
then it relieves us from the uncertainty of 
creation related to the allegedly preexistent 
choice of the possible worlds with 
different boundary conditions and makes 
the problem of the specific temporal 
beginning (as special boundary conditions) 
of our universe to be transformed toward 
the problem of the special ontological 
distinction, or extension (diastema) 
between God and the world. This 
transformation allows one to look at the 
distinction between God and the universe 
(that is between uncreated and created) in 
terms of a definite structure in creation, 
namely in terms of the difference between 
that world which has its corporeal 
representation and those potential worlds 
which do not have such a  representation 
remaining no more then intelligible traces 
of that which could be known by God, but 
not created in the corporeal form. The 
actual choice of creating our universe is 
thus a setting up a special difference in 
creation between intelligible (created non-
corporeal worlds) and sensible (our actual 
world).   In this case the setting of the 
boundary conditions for the actual physical 
universe, as a corporeal choice out of many 
possible universes, implies that these 
boundary conditions, or the origin of the 
physical universe, presuppose a definite 
structure of the intelligible realm which 
complements the actual universe in the 
whole creation. In different words, the 
choice of the corporeal world out of many 
potential worlds means setting up the basic 
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ontological difference (the basic diaphora) 
in creation, which thus becomes a 
constitutive element of creatio ex nihilo.23 
The will and wisdom  of God in creating 
this world with its particular immanent age 
(which is the subject of Maximus’ 
discussion) is thus encapsulated in the 
specific diaphora between this world and 
all those which are not destined to become 
corporeal. And it is this last sentence that 
unfolds to some extent the sense of the 
logos of creation of our universe.  
 
 Coming back to the initial stance of 
Maximus on creation, one could suggest 
that his ultimate objective was to provide a 
logical and philosophical argument that the 
world had a beginning in the sense that it is 
not eternal and hence incommensurable 
with God. The fact that the world’s parts 
are subject to temporal flux and decay is 
part of the mundane experience. The 
question of the temporality and decay of 
the world as a whole is much more 
problematic. Everything depends on how 
this wholeness is understood: if it is just an 
additive something comprised of the parts, 
then the criteria of the finitude and created 
temporality can be applied to the world as 
well. However there is a difficulty, which 
is well understood in modern cosmology, 
that one cannot speak about the universe as 
a whole as being in space and time and 
hence as subject to the same constitutional 
synthesis which is applied to separate 
physical objects. In this sense the universe 
as a whole is not in space and time and that 
is why it is unclear how one can 
contrapose the whole universe to the 
Divine eternity and what kind of 
incommensurability is implied here. The 
logical inconsistency of applying such 
notions as space and time to the universe 
as a whole, does not remove, however, the 
fact that the universe is created and its 
contingency requires a sufficient 
foundation. If this universe as a whole is 
not eternal (in terms of immanent time), 
then it has “transcendent beginning” which 
rather implies a logical origination, or 
dependence upon something which is 
absolutely necessary. Even if cosmology 
would pronounce that the world is eternal 
as evolving indefinitely in terms of the 
immanent time, this eternity as an endless 
temporal flux has a different ontological 
status in comparison with the transworldly 
eternity understood as absolutely necessary 
being.  
 
 Here we come to an interesting 
point about the wholeness of the universe. 
For Maximus the whole or the totality of 
the universe was not of the same 
ontological order as the parts of the 
universe (Mystagogy 1). In his time, when 
physics, applied to the visible universe did 
not exist, it was natural to suspect that the 
decoherent and chaotic parts in the created 
order  are brought to the unity by the 
supreme principle of harmony and beauty, 
which is God himself. This was the point 
of view of Maximus’ predecessors, such as 
Athanasius of Alexandria, as well as that 
of Maximus himself. Nowadays 
cosmology presents the whole of the 
visible display of the universe as ordered 
and structured due to the physical laws 
which act across the universe, including its 
remote past. Correspondingly,  the 
wholeness of the universe is understood as 
its parts being held together by the forces 
of nature. There still remains a question of 
the origin of these laws: some suggestions 
point to the boundary conditions of the 
universe which are responsible for this 
order. Ultimately, this entails that the 
totality of the universe is associated with a 
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kind of “beginning = boundary” which 
“separates” this universe from that which 
is “beyond” it in an ontological sense, that 
is, as contingent upon “that” beyond.   
Cosmology asserts the totality of the 
universe not as a sum total of its parts, but 
as that unique remote state in the past of 
the universe which is treated as the 
originary origin of the universe, the so 
called Big Bang. One can responsibly 
think of the totality of the universe only 
through the notion of the Big Bang 
because it is only in the vicinity of the Big 
Bang that  one could potentially have 
access to the universe in its entirety: the 
visible part of the universe comprises only 
a tiny part of the universe as a whole, 
physically relating to it only through the 
common origin in the Big Bang.  
Graphically this can be illustrated with the 
help of a diagram where the visible 
universe is indicated by the onion-like 
curve, whereas the rest of the circle is that 




 The centre of this diagram 
symbolises the Big Bang and the 
concentric circles symbolise the universe 
as a whole corresponding to different 
cosmic times. The unity of the universe for 
every moment of time is guaranteed only 
by its procession from the original Big 
Bang state.  Humanity, being contingently 
positioned in the universe, could 
potentially have access to this totality only 
through the Big Bang, that is in the remote 
past. However the Big Bang, being a 
mental construction can be accessed only 
intelligibly. In this sense the notion of the 
Big Bang is similar to what was implied by 
Maximus when he claimed that the totality 
of the universe is not of the same 
ontological order as things of the universe. 
Being an intelligible construct the Big 
Bang (as well as the universe as a whole) 
is of a different ontological order in 
comparison with particular empirical 
things in the universe. One can conclude 
that the cosmology of the evolving 
universe with a temporal flux and decay 
pertaining to it, points to the original 
“state” of a different ontological order, 
beyond which physics is naturally 
problematic.  This entails in turn another 
conclusion that the totality of the universe 
in its contingent formation refers to its 
otherness, which in scientific cosmology 
(not in theology), can mean not the 
transworldly  foundation, but an 
ontologically different (but created), 
intelligible unity, which is invoked by 
theoretical scientists. In this sense, 
epistemologically, one cannot assert the 
wholeness of the world as a physical 
property per se; rather one can only claim 
that as such it belongs to the intelligible 
world, whose existence, however, can be 
asserted through the observation of things 
empirical. Where this intelligible unity 
comes from and why it is possible to detect 
it at all, these questions can be answered 
by reference to Maximus: according to him 
the principle of unity in totality explicates 
	   16	  
to some extent the content of that to which 
he refers as logoi of creation.   
 
 In brief, the logoi of natural created 
beings, which are the forming principles 
and ideas of the sensible and intelligible 
things, on the one hand,  are apprehended 
as existing through the links with their  
common source, that is the Divine Logos; 
on the other hand, the same logoi can be 
considered with respect to the world which 
is constituted by them. The whole created 
world is seen then as manifesting the 
different intensities (condensations) of the 
incarnation of the Logos, which is 
mysteriously hidden in His logoi under the 
surface of the created being (Ambigua 10  
[PG 91: 1129B]). The logoi have a 
complex relationship to the Logos of God 
and to the created world. On the one hand, 
according to  Maximus the logoi are 
preexistent in God; on the other hand God 
called them  to realization in concrete 
creation to show forth the  continual  
presence the Logos  in Creation. One can 
assert that the logoi  are both  transcendent 
to and immanent with  the created world;  
as immanent they manifest the divine 
intentions and principles of  every single 
nature, that is, of every object,  thing, law 
and their intelligible image; they manifest 
the existential purpose of every thing they 
materialize in the created order, but they 
are not themselves created. In other words 
their “material” manifestations through 
sensible things and their intelligible 
images, do not condition  them  from 
within the creation; for they have the 
ground  of their immanent manifestations 
in the transcendent Logos. The logoi do 
not dissolve the Logos, and their unity in 
the Logos does not eliminate their 
individuality. The logoi are thus neither 
identical with the essence of God, nor with 
the empirical forms of existence of the 
things of the created world. Maximus 
invokes a geometrical analogy  (used 
before him by Proclus, Plotinus and 
Dionysius the Areopagite), that  of the 
radii and the centre of   a  circle, in order to 
describe the relationship between the 
Logos, Who is the center of a circle, and 
the logoi which represent the radii of the 
circle, originating from the center and 
terminating on the boundary of a circle, 
which imitates the created realm 
(Mystagogy 1, Chapters on Knowledge 
2.4).  
 
 Now, coming back to the issue of 
the totality of the universe, one can give an 
interpretation of the cosmological diagram 
at the Fig. 3, combining it with the 
graphical presentation of the logoi by 
Maximus mentioned above. On the one 
hand, seen from within the created  
universe, the principle of unity of this 
universe can be referred to the Big Bang as 
that originary origin which gives rise to all 
states of the physical universe afterwards. 
The radii at this diagram originate at the 
original singularity of the Big Bang and 
terminate at the circumference which 
denotes the present day state of the 
universe as a whole. The wholeness of the 
universe represented by the set of circles at 
this diagram manifest itself as an 
intelligible “object” (a construct) which is 
accessible only through intellectual 
intuition because there is no empirical 
access to the universe outside of the past 
light cone (onion-like curve). The causal 
unity of the universe could have been in 
physical existence only in its past, that is in 
the Big Bang. From the point of view of 
observations even this remains no more 
than a hypothetical possibility because the 
universe was hot and non-transparent 
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before a certain early age (300-400 
thousands years after the Big Bang) so that 
at present stage of knowledge the 
“empirical access” to the past of the 
universe is possible only through indirect 
experiments based on  fundamental 
particle theories. The logos of the universe, 
that is the principle of its unity and totality, 
can thus manifest itself either through a 
causal connection of the visible universe 
and the rest of its totality at the Big Bang, 
or, through intelligible causality, linking 
the present-day visible universe with the 
allegedly existing overall totality of the 
universe (beyond the visible). The 
contemplation and intellection of the 
universe as a whole leads human mind to a 
split in the representation of the universe 
onto its physical part and an intelligible 
counterpart, revealing that which Maximus 
the Confessor called the basic diaphora in 
creation, namely the difference between 
the realm of sensible and intelligible.  
  
 Physical cosmology is not satisfied 
with a simple assertion that the universe as 
a whole can only be an idea (rational of 
aesthetical). It wants to go further in order 
to justify a scientific methodology of 
thinking and speaking of the universe as a 
whole. Since the Big Bang predicts the 
multitude of causally disconnected regions 
in the universe cosmology needs to remove 
the epistemological consequences of the 
contingency of the human position in the 
universe and thus the contingency of that 
display of the astronomical universe which 
we observe. This causal disconnectedness 
can be interpreted as the initial disordering 
of the universe related to its being created 
out of nothing, that nothing which does not 
have any principles of order. However,  
there is still one ordering principle which 
unites all causally disconnected parts of 
the universe “together”, namely the 
principle that all these parts have a 
common origin in that nothing. The 
principle of this origin, its logos, being a 
principle by definition, must have its 
explication and an outward  formulation.  
Cosmology states this principle under the 
title “cosmological principle”, that is the 
principle of the cosmographic uniformity 
of the universe: the universe as a whole, to 
be physically comprehensible and 
explicable, must look the same at large 
scales from all possible hypothetical places 
in the universe which are not accessible to 
human observers. One sees that the logos 
of the universe, that is the underlying 
principle of its creation,  receives its 
further elucidation as the principle of 
explicability of the universe by humanity. 
But this principle of explicability, or 
rationality, of the universe is generated by 
the Logos of God through Whom and by 
Whom this universe is created. The 
elucidation of that which is meant by the 
logos of creation through the cosmological 
principle does not entail that this logos is 
known in the sense of Maximus. One can 
account, for example, neither for the 
facticity of this principle as such, nor for 
the contingent facticity  of the universe. In 
spite of this one has a twofold elucidation 
of this logos: the constitutive  difference in 
creation between the visible (empirical) 
and invisible (intelligible), is brought to 
their mutual unity in knowledge through 
the cosmological principle of homogeneity 
in the created order.  
 
 Finally, one can combine the 
cosmological diagram (Fig. 3) with the 
graphical presentation of the logoi by 
Maximus, extending it to three dimensions 
where the vertical dimension corresponds 
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to the transworldly foundation of the 





On the one hand the vertical dimension 
links the original point of the universe (the 
Big Bang) with the Logos of God by 
whom and through whom the visible 
universe (as well as the non-observable 
and invisible) was brought into being. This 
vertical link can be associated with the 
logos of creation, related to the universe as 
we understand it. However the presence of 
the logoi is not restricted only to the Big 
Bang. The universe as a whole (including 
the visible one) is supported and sustained 
by the logoi in all aspects of its existence, 
so that the logoi proceed from the Logos to 
all other points of the universe (the 
boundary of a circle) at present. In this 
sense the meaning of the cosmological 
principle as the equivalence of all points 
on the circumference at present time can 
be interpreted   as a theogenic uniformity 
related to the presence of the logoi in all 
potentially possible points of the universe. 
The logos of creation receives its further 
formulation as a principle of theogenic 
uniformity of the universe. The question of 
what are the grounds that cosmology can 
proceed from the theogenic uniformity to 
the cosmographic uniformity 
(cosmological principle) relates to the 
anthropological issue of how and why the 
Divine image in humanity (perceiving 
theogenic uniformity preteoretically) 
cascades towards its outward theoretical 
expression through the principle of spatial 
or material uniformity.   The temporal 
beginning of the created universe in the 
diagram above means that the Big Bang 
itself was not in place on the same 
ontological level as it is for the Logos: the 
appearance of the original point in the 
diagram implies the appearance together 
with it of the whole plane in which the 
diagram was drawn.  However, it is quite 
difficult to express graphically the 
ontological “non-simultaneity” of the 
universe and the Logos, that is the creation 
of the universe. 
 
 The important conclusion from this 
discussion is that modern cosmology, in 
spite of all its attempts to predicate the 
initial state of the universe through the 
theories of the Big Bang, comes to the 
same conclusion that was grasped long 
before by Maximus, namely  that the 
“original” state of the universe which 
symbolises its unity, identity and totality 
cannot be defined in immanent terms; it 
requires a founding principle which 
explicates the logos of creation of the 
universe, the principle which can be 
formulated in Maximus’ words as “the 
whole of creation admits of one and the 
same undiscriminated logos, as having not 
been before it is” 24 , or, “the divine 
principle which holds the entire creation  
together is that it should have non-being as 
the ground of its being.” 25 This helps to 
give the discursive explanation of what it 
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means to detect the presence of the logos 
of creation from within the created realm: 
namely to establish the understanding that 
every created object, intelligible or 
sensible, is theogenically uniform, that is it 
has one and the same transcendent ground 
of its existence in its non-existence (non-
being), or, in different words, in its 
otherness. It is this theogenic uniformity 
which cascades, in cosmology, to the 
cosmographic uniformity.   
 
 Modern cosmology is unanimous 
in that the Big Bang was an event in the 
past which is extraordinary and 
antecedently efficacious with respect to all 
possible events that happened in the 
universe since then.  This exceptional 
event, predicted theoretically and having 
some observational consequences tests the 
limits of the physical sciences. That 
physics which has been discovered on the 
planet earth in a relatively short historical 
period can be applied only up to this 
boundary in the past of the universe 
beyond which any scientific claim is 
problematic. In spite of the obvious fact 
that there is no evidence  for claiming that 
this event can be associated with creatio ex 
nihilo, its theoretical prediction at least  
sheds the light on some constitutive  
elements of creatio ex nihilo, which  
explicate the logos of creation of the 
universe. We intentionally avoid any talk 
about the “explanation” of the creation of 
the universe out of nothing; instead we 
speak of the detection of the presence of 
the logos of creation, the logos of that 
originary state in the universe with respect 
to which human comprehension 
experiences an imminent difficulty.  
 
 It is important to realise that the 
detection of the logos of creation contains 
in itself a movement of human thought in 
two opposite directions: on the one hand 
the detection of the logos takes place 
through the contemplation of the universe 
through scientific advance as a process 
directed to the future. On the other hand an 
attempt to detect the logos through the 
theory of the original past of the universe 
positions the intended material pole of 
cosmological explanation in the temporal 
past of the world. In other words, the 
explication of the logos of creation of the 
universe as related to its past becomes the 
telos of cosmological explanation. 26  To 
understand the cosmos and make it fully 
“humanised” in the sense of Maximus’ 
“makro-anthropos” idea, one must 
understand its origination, those 
constitutive elements in creation which 
point to the logos of creation of the 
universe.  One can reiterate by saying that 
when Maximus appeals in the natural 
attitude of consciousness to the idea of the 
logos of creation, he implies that the 
unfolding of the sense of this logos, its 
mental and linguistic explication (through 
or with the help of the natural 
contemplation27)  is a dynamic process 
which is always directed to the future, but 
whose ultimate goal is to understand the 
sense of creation of the world either in 
terms of its temporal past  or in terms of its 
ontological otherness with respect to God.  
Since, according to Maximus, the creation 
of the world has its root in the divine 
wisdom and will, the detection of the 
presence of the logos of creation through 
cosmological theories ultimately points 
towards the wisdom and will of God which 
are hidden in creation. The telos which 
pertains to the human ascent to the Divine, 
through overcoming obstacles to the unity 
of creation and God (and by which, 
according to Maximus, it is destined to be 
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transfigured), becomes in cosmology the 
telos of cosmological explanation, that is 
an ultimate unfolding of the sense of  the 
universe’s contingent facticity, as well as 
the contingent facticity of human beings. 
However this telos can only be fulfilled 
through the reference to the saving 
economy of the Divine in the created 
world. This brings into our discussion 
another dimension which makes the issue 
of creation of the world and the sense of 
the universe to be closely connected with 
the Incarnation of the Logos of God in 
Jesus Christ.  
 
Humanity in the Universe  
 
Maximus the Confessor’s theology asserts 
the creation of the world out of nothing by 
the Divine wisdom and will. This means 
that on the one hand there is no necessary 
link between the essence of God and the 
essence of the world, on the other hand the 
world is created according to that wisdom 
which makes it possible to fulfil the Divine 
economy. This entails that the perennial 
issue of the contingent facticity of the 
created world must somehow be linked to 
the divine intentions with respect to this 
world. The contingent facticity of the 
universe means that its physical parameters 
have specific values: modern cosmology  
teaches us that the physical universe is old 
and huge. Humanity lives in the periphery 
of a mediocre galaxy among billions and 
billions of other galaxies, in a mediocre 
stellar system with the contingent number 
of planets at one of which exists life. 
Contingency of humanity in the universe 
means that it is because of the spatial and 
temporal incommensurability between the 
universe and human embodied creatures 
that there is no sense of talking about the 
cosmographic centrality of the planet 
Earth.  There  are specific cosmic 
conditions which must necessarily  satisfy 
for human beings to exist in their 
biological form. These conditions tell us 
not only that we live in a very  special 
planet but that  we live at a particular 
temporal era in the universe’s 
development. This era is characterised by 
two major factors: the availability of the 
physical material (stardust) to form human 
bodies,  and particular large-scale 
parameters of expansion of the universe, 
which allow us to make insights on its 
evolution and origin in the remote past. 
Thus, in spite of a mediocre position in 
space, we live in a special era of time  
which is effectively responsible not only 
for our physical shape  but also for our 
ability to learn about the universe and 
detect the presence of the logos of creation. 
By generalising this, we live in such era 
when theology is possible in the universe. 
Here we come back to the theological 
question posed in the beginning of this 
paragraph: why the world was created by 
God out of nothing in such a peculiar way 
in order to have us, that is those who 
predicate God through relating the 
universe to Him? Rephrased formally, it 
can amount to the question about the 
sufficient conditions for humanity’s 
existence in the image of God. 
 
 The answer to this question could 
come from a  theological assertion that 
God anticipated the creation of the world 
in the perspective of the mystery of Christ, 
that is the Incarnation of the Logos of 
God.28 Seen post-factum, the Incarnation 
required a human body, a body of Jesus,  
as well as the body of his Mother, ever-
virgin Mary. As we have mentioned 
before, the existence of a body is related to 
the specific physical and biological 
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conditions and, as it is understood in 
cosmology, the whole large-scale spatio-
temporal structure of the observable 
universe is pivotal for that. 
Correspondingly there is a question: does 
the free creation of the world out of love 
by the Divine counsel presuppose an 
element of necessity related to the 
Incarnation of the Logos which was 
foreseen before the creation of the world 
and which is related to the recapitulation of 
humanity in Christ?  
 
 One can conjecture that the 
structure of the natural world has a direct 
relation to God’s providential activity in 
the world in order to fulfil His plan. This 
implies that for the Incarnation of God  to 
take place on Earth, in the visible universe, 
this universe must possess some features 
such that the making of man in God’s 
image as well as the incarnation of God in 
human flesh would be  possible. This links 
the creation of the universe and its 
structure to the phenomenon of man, and 
the Incarnation articulates this link, 
making the whole sense of it as being 
grounded in the will and love of the 
personal God, who transfers the image of 
His personality to human beings who in 
turn can articulate the universe as being 
amazingly fashioned for life. The 
cosmological anthropic principle which 
links the structure of the universe to the 
conditions of biological existence can then 
receive its theological generalisation as 
that principle which links the structure of 
space-time and matter of the entire 
universe with the possibility of the 
Incarnation.  Apart from the physic-
biological conditions for existence of 
living beings this extension touches upon 
the most important aspect of humanity’s 
existence related to its being the centre of 
disclosure and manifestation of the 
universe from within the universe, that is 
its further articulation through knowledge 
which partially explicates the sense of 
what is meant by the Divine image of man. 
The Divine image requires not only human 
body, but the archetype of the hypostasis 
of Christ. To have knowledge of the 
universe as a whole humanity must have 
been endowed with that ability of the fully 
human Jesus Christ to experience the 
universe as “all in all” through Christ the 
Logos who is fully divine and through 
whom and by whom the universe is created 
and sustained. Correspondingly the 
abovementioned extension of the anthropic 
principle transforms into a theological 
principle of creation of man: the universe 
must have been created in such a way in 
order to have the conditions for creation of 
man in the image of God, the conditions 
which have been recapitulated in the 
Incarnation.  However, humanity is not 
just the purpose of creation; its coming 
into existence can only be understood in 
the context of the promise of God for  its 
salvation.    
 
 Thus the conditions for the 
possibility of the Incarnation are encoded 
in the facticity of the world whose mode of 
being proceeds from the hypostatic action 
of the Logos, who confirmed this through 
the Incarnation. And it is this facticity that 
predetermines the possibility of appearance 
of humanity as that vessel (receptacle) in 
which the Incarnation was possible, as well 
as that personal medium through which 
God realises the world’s communion with 
himself. One can conjecture in this case 
that if the Incarnation was foreseen by God 
before all ages, then the precondition for 
humanity to appear in the universe must 
have been in place in the “act” of creation. 
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Then one can further conjecture that the 
world was freely created love but with a 
certain intent. Then one can think that the 
structure of the material world in its 
contingent essence has a direct relationship 
to the providential action of God in the 
world in order to fulfil its promise for 
salvation.  This can be further explicated 
through a reference to Maximus’s 
discussion of the possibility to know God 
from within creation. Maximus affirms 
that the only possible approach to 
knowledge of God is through 
contemplating the effect of the preserving 
and providential power of God. Here is the 
quotation:  
 
“It is in terms of no principle or concept or 
even reality that the divine has relation and 
communion with the things that are, but it 
is completely and in every way 
transcendent,  and only grasped from his 
preserving and foreseeing everything…”29  
 
There are two crucial words emphasised in 
this quotation: “preserving” and 
“foreseeing”. These words characterise 
Divine activity within creation. We will 
analyse the sense of “preserving”. 30  To 
preserve means to preserve certain already 
created things, that is to “conserve” them 
in their identity from the overall decay to 
which creation after the Fall is subjected. 
To preserve things means to take care of 
these things through sustaining their 
integrity and supporting them in receiving 
God and responding to his invitation for 
being in communion with him.  
“Preserving” could mean the conservation, 
sustenance of the species, or a particular 
kind of created objects. Their self-identity 
follows from them to be individually 
enhypostasized by the Logos.  But the 
identity of a created object as unique and 
separate from others implies, from the 
point of view of the created order, two 
things: their identity in space, that is their 
corporeal  separatedness, and their identity 
in time (endurance) as the possibility of  
stability and knowability of this particular 
created existence. When one refers to the 
intelligible world, one can speak about 
“preservation” of ideas and intelligible 
entities in general, that is regardless time – 
it is a kind of “logical conservation”, 
sustenance etc. However being projected 
onto human life,   this conservation of 
ideas is understood as their constant 
presence in time in the mind of human 
beings. Time is still present as that 
background which makes it possible to 
discriminate temporality as a flux and a-
temporality, as frozen time. This means 
that our articulation of eternal ideas 
assumes the intrinsic temporality of our 
consciousness. Preservation in this case 
means the stability of our consciousness, 
that is the conditions such as memory or 
internal time-consciousness, which makes 
it possible to discern patterns and 
structures in the background of the variety 
of sense-data. Stability of consciousness 
includes not only memory but also ability 
to attempt to plan the future as if it has 
already been in existence. One means here 
the memory of the future, as the realisation 
of that teleological ingredient which is 
present in human consciousness as 
activity. Thus “preservation” means in this 
sense some particular pattern of the human 
subjectivity which makes it possible to 
contemplate God. “Preservation” means 
the faithfulness of God to and constant 
God’s presence in humanity while the 
sustenance of space and time become the 
conditions for this to be possible at all.  
The understanding of the Church, as the 
body of Christ, as catholicity and multi-
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hypostatic consubstantiality, implies a 
principle of differentiation of hypostases, 
that is human persons, in space and in 
time. This is necessary for the Logos to 
take human nature in the incarnation and to 
be different and distinct from other human 
beings.  The incarnate Logos-Christ 
recapitulated human nature in general, but 
still the incarnation took place in a 
concrete and specific man – Jesus from 
Nazareth, who was different from others. It 
is in this sense that space of creation 
manifests the principle of differentiation 
(diaphora) (not division (diairesis)) of 
humanity onto many individuals.  
 
 Since the differentiation of human 
beings still presupposes their unity as 
related to the same Father, the 
accommodating space must prevent the 
disintegration of hypostases. Thus the 
unity of space is of the same quality as the 
unity of many hypostatic beings: it comes 
from the Logos and is determined by him. 
It is exactly from this that the catholicity of 
Christians (as conciliarity) receives its 
justification: the catholicity is the unity of 
people and hence the unity of their shared 
space; it is not only humanity’s 
consubstantiality, but their con-spatiality 
as belonging to the same encompassing 
space which is a form of relationship with 
God.31  The same can be said about time in 
light of the idea of pleroma of humanity.32 
Correspondingly space and time appear to 
be those forms of mediation between 
creatures and God, which make it possible 
to realise the Divine promise for salvation 
implanted in the creation and rearticulated 
in the Incarnation. If so, then, by applying 
the logic of physics of the created one can 
refine further the conditions for the 
Incarnation.   
 
 The  “preserving” of physical 
objects can easily be interpreted as 
conservation of their physical qualities, 
related, for example, to energy (mass), 
momentum (velocity), angular momentum 
(spin).   It is known that conservation laws 
and the existence of corresponding 
integrals of motion is the consequence of 
space-time symmetries. Homogeneity 
(uniformity) of time entails energy 
conservation.  It is because of this 
uniformity that the identity of objects  as 
stability in time is possible. 33  Physical 
cosmology asserts the evolution of the 
universe in time, but the temporal scale of 
changes in this universe is so huge (with 
respect to the human life on Earth) that one 
can assume that time effectively has been  
homogeneous for the last 4.5 billion years 
of Earth’s existence. Uniformity of space 
entails momentum (velocity) conservation 
which makes it possible to separate objects 
from the forces which acts upon them. The 
uniformity of space is confirmed by 
indirect observations and serves as, we 
mentioned above, a major epistemological 
presumption of the knowability of the 
universe (cosmological principle, that is 
the principle of cosmographic uniformity 
of the universe). Thus the cosmographic 
uniformity of the universe can be 
theologically justified through God’s 
preserving power upon creation in order 
ultimately to reveal himself to human 
being. In this case the principle of 
theogenic uniformity which we have 
discussed above becomes in its 
formulation exactly what Maximus 
described in terms of “preserving”. The 
transition from theogenic uniformity to 
cosmographic uniformity then can be 
elucidated by placing the Maximian 
theological sense of God’s preserving of 
creation in a physical context.    
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 If, coming back to the quotation 
from Maximus where “preserving and 
foreseeing” is associated with the modes of 
humanity’s knowledge  of God, then one 
can go further by explicating this 
“preserving”, first of all, as preserving the 
very existence of  human beings 
themselves. This existence is defined by 
the necessary conditions following from 
physics and biology. Thus preserving in 
this case means the support of fundamental 
physical constants which  are responsible 
for the stability of material structures, like 
planets and atoms, which make it possible 
the corporeal existence of human beings 
and, theologically, the Incarnation to 
happen. For example, the dimension of 
space d=3 is necessary for the planetary 
and atomic orbits to be stable and thus 
“preserving” those structures  which are 
necessary for life.34  This type of a link 
between the large-scale structure of the 
universe and the fact of existence of life 
that appears in cosmology in rubrics of the 
so called anthropic inference can be 
employed in order to demonstrate that the 
“preserving” of the large scale-structure of 
the created universe and hence human life 
in it can be used a pointer (paradeigmata) 
towards detecting the presence of the 
Divine in the universe. Thus the facticity 
of space and time can be used as a 
witnesses to the special relationship 
between God and the created world based 
in God’s intent for such a creation which 
will make possible to fulfil his plan. The 
world is hypostatically in the Person of 
God. If this “is”  for God is the bringing 
the world inside the sphere of Divine 
interiority, in order to make the world of 
its own and to bring it in communion with 
Himself, for the created humanity  this “is” 
is the all-encompassing wholeness of the 
world as  its spatial, geometrical whole, 
which, in spite of its extended properties 
seen from within the world, is perceived as 
the manifestation of the Divine 
relationship to the whole world as devoid 
of any extension and distance. One can say 
that the universe as a whole is 
theologically homogeneous, that is 
“theogenic”, because God is present at 
every point of the universe through the fact 
that all parts of the universe are equally 
enhypostasised by him, so that there is no 
extension and distance  between God and 
the universe.  In this sense if sometimes 
the universe is presented graphically as a 
geometrically extended shape embedded in 
a sort of pre-existent continuum, for the 
Logos of God this universe is an instant or 
an event, in which all distances and ages 
are encapsulated in the archetypically 
present “all in all”.  This implies further 
that space and time reveal themselves as 
those particular modalities of the world 
which explicate the archetypically present 
“all in all” of creation in the conditions 
after the Fall.  Since the created world is 
corporeal the extended space perceived by 
human beings  can be treated as  that 
corporeal form of communion with the 
Divine which itself is “preserved” by God 
(and which is the source of further 
“preserving” through a purposeful 
articulation of the universe by human 
beings).   
 
 
The Ecclesial Vision of the Cosmos in 
Maximus the Confessor 
  
The reformulation of the cosmological 
anthropic principle in terms of humanity 
made in the image of God, presupposes 
that humanity is not treated anymore as a 
natural microcosm.  Rather it acquires a 
	   25	  
different status which can be termed as a 
hypostatic microcosm. What is meant by 
this term can be grasped from the fact that 
human reason can penetrate in thought 
through space and time and contemplate in 
different symbols things ‘both invisible 
and invisible’, both micro-particles and 
cosmological structures. It is because of 
the hypostatic unity of the body and soul 
that it is possible to argue (together with 
Maximus the Confessor as well as other 
patristic writers) that man, in a way, 
imitates in his composition the whole 
universe (that is, the empirical and the 
intelligible realms). In other words, 
humanity manifests in itself the basic 
diaphora (difference) in creation that 
points to the logos that holds the different 
parts of creation together.  
  
 Maximus the Confessor developed 
an allegorical interpretation of   the 
universe as man, and conversely of man as 
microcosm, recapitulating in its 
constitution the whole creation. He 
articulates in Mystagogy 7 the similarity 
between the composition of the human 
being and the composition of the universe 
from a point of view of the hypostatic 
unity of the different parts in them.35	  In a 
scientific cosmological context this can be 
interpreted as an insight that leads the 
cosmologist beyond the sphere of the 
visible, which is accessible to the senses, 
to that which is invisible (for example, to 
the wholeness of the universe or its origin) 
and can only be described in the 
mathematical terms with which human 
reason (being an analytical part of soul) 
operates. Reason dwells in the body, and it 
is through the visible universe that reason 
reaches the intelligible universe. It is 
because of the hypostatic unity of 
cosmologists’ bodies and souls that they 
can reveal the hypostatic unity of the 
visible and intelligible universe. A 
cosmologist relates opposing phenomena: 
the small (atoms) and the large (galaxies); 
the visible, present cosmos and its invisible 
past; the cosmos as a multiplicity of 
different visible facts (stars, galaxies, the 
distribution of clusters of galaxies, etc.) 
and the mathematical cosmos (as uniform 
and isotropic space, etc.).	  
 
 The ability to recapitulate through 
knowledge all constituents of the universe, 
and to realise that the human existence is 
deeply dependent on the natural aspects 
both of the microworld and the cosmos as 
a whole, makes the position of humans in 
the universe exceptional and unique. The 
recapitulation of the universe in man takes 
place not only on the natural level (as is 
affirmed in the anthropic arguments), but - 
and this is much more non-trivial - on the 
hypostatic level implying that human 
beings are participating in the outward 
hypostasization of their own existence by 
revealing the meaning of various levels of 
the universe.  This is possible only because 
human beings can use their own hypostasis 
in order to bring the not yet articulate 
existents in the universe to a proper, 
personal mode of existing.  In other words, 
human persons, or humankind in general, 
in spite of being physically located in one 
particular point of the universe, share their 
existence with all other places and ages of 
the universe through the fusion made 
possible by knowledge. This existence of 
the universe in the other, that is in human 
beings, means that the universe is en-
hypostasized by human beings. 36  
Humanity, as an event, becomes itself the 
source of a further en-hypostasization in 
the universe that reveals intelligibility of 
the universe, the soteriological meaning of 
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its creation.  Thus the universe is present in 
one and the same human being both 
through the bodily consubstantialilty, and 
through the hypostatic inherence of it 
within human subjectivity.37 What makes 
the image of the universe as a whole 
possible and what is the principle which 
holds this image interlinked with the 
physical universe remains a deep 
philosophical and theological mystery. To 
address this mystery one needs to turn to 
the Christological dimension of any 
philosophising on humanity’s place in 
creation, in particular, to the relevance of 
the Incarnation. Indeed the Incarnation 
provides us with the only available 
historical and archetypical evidence of 
how a human being can hold the entire 
universe in a single consciousness. To 
make it explicit, it is worth appealing to 
the non-trivial connection between the 
problem of space in the universe and the 
concept of the Incarnation. 38  The link 
between the Incarnation and the spatial 
display of the universe takes the form of a 
paradox: on the one hand, Jesus Christ, 
being in full human nature, lived in the 
world and was located in a body in a 
particular place and time of the Earth’s 
history (in Palestine two thousand years 
ago). On the other hand, being fully God, 
he did not leave his ‘place’ on the right 
hand side of the Father, and thus, was was 
always present in all places and times of 
the universe created by him. We have here 
a non-trivial temporal and spatial 
relationship between the finite ‘track’ of 
Jesus in empirical space and time and the 
whole history of the universe as the unity 
of “all in all” of spaces and times of the 
universe proceeding from the Logos’ 
creation of the universe.  
 
 Origen first reflected on the 
extraordinary position of Christ, being man 
and God, in the universe  conceived of in 
terms of space.39 Origen stressed the point 
that God, who is the creator and governor 
of the whole universe, by becoming 
incarnate in the flesh in Jesus Christ, did 
not cease to be, as God, the provider of 
existence and intelligibility for every thing 
at every point in the universe.  Being 
incarnate in the flesh, that is being a man 
among men, Christ as God was still ruling 
the whole universe and holding together 
the entire creation.  By creating the 
universe and giving it meaning so that it 
could receive the his Son in the flesh, God 
has prepared a place for himself, but in 
such a way, that while descending into the 
created world in a particular place and time 
he still holds the entire creation together, 
being present himself in all possible 
‘places’ of the universe. One can say 
therefore that the Incarnation recapitulates 
the whole creation in the totality of its 
spatial and temporal spans, and not just 
human nature. By being incarnate at one 
point of space and at the same time not 
leaving his ‘place’ as transcendent Creator, 
and by holding together the wholeness of 
space, God demonstrates that his 
relationship to space is not a spatial 
relation.40  
 Athanasius of Alexandria 
expressed the unity of the divine and 
human in Christ appealing to the analogy 
of space in terms similar to those used by 
Origen.41 Athanasius argues that in spite of 
the fact that the Son-Word of God 
descended to Earth in order to live with 
men, he did not become closer to us by 
doing so, for he is always in everything in 
the universe, which was made by him. 
‘Space’ is a predicate of the Word of God; 
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it is determined by his agency and is to be 
understood according to his nature. This 
means that the ‘spatial relationship’ 
between the Father and the Son is in no 
way analogous to the spatial relations 
among creaturely things. Human nature in 
Christ always operated within the reality of 
empirical space and historical time, 
whereas his divine nature was always 
beyond the empirical and intelligible aeons 
in the uncreated realm from where Christ 
the Logos of God coordinates the 
empirical space in which he dwelt in the 
body with the rest of the created universe. 
The Christ-event, being thus a 
manifestation of the spatio-temporal 
relationship between God and the physical  
universe, recapitulates the very 
humankind-event relating it to the whole 
structure of creation. 
 One can use a different analogy in 
order to illustrate this point.  Indeed, space 
and time are perceived by human beings 
from within creation and can be treated as 
“internal” forms of the relation of the 
universe with the transcendent Divine.  
This internal form of space and time 
cannot be conceived, however, without its 
“external” counterpart, that is its 
“boundary”, which can hypothetically be 
articulated from “outside”, that is from the 
perspective of the uncreated. The question 
that then arises is how is the internal 
space-time of the universe maintained in 
relationship with the divine “environment” 
(that is its “external” form) in which it 
embedded?  Here an analogy with the 
hypostatic union of the two natures in 
Christ can be used. Indeed, it is because of 
the hypostatic union between the divine 
and the natural (human) in Christ that one 
can argue by analogy that the interplay 
between the space and time of the universe 
and its uncreated ground is also upheld 
hypostatically by God in the course of his 
“economy” in relation to the world. The 
fulfilment of this economy took place in 
the Incarnation when the link between the 
humanity of Christ (in space) and his 
divinity as the Logos  (beyond space) was 
established. Thus the universe in its spatio-
temporal extension manifests its 
Christologically evidenced hypostatic 
inherence in the Logos. 
 
 The Incarnation of the Logos of 
God in flesh, which entails the 
annunciation of the Kingdom of God, 
brings the whole of humanity not only to 
the realization of its microcosmic function, 
but also to a knowledge of its ecclesial 
function in building the universal Church 
as the Body of Christ. Humanity is called 
by God to be the ‘priest of creation’. Then 
the whole universe, having participated 
through its creation and the Incarnation in 
the hypostasis of the Logos, will be 
represented for human beings in the Holy 
Church.  Maximus develops the analogy 
between Church and the universe in his 
Mystagogy 2.42  It is from this analogy that 
one sees again the cosmological meaning 
of the Incarnation: the whole Church 
represents the world, and it is Christ who is 
the head and the foundation of the Church. 
The universe, being mirrored in the 
Church, is held hypostatically by the 
Logos of God, who is the head of the 
universe understood as a Church.  When 
we say that the universe inheres in the 
hypostasis of the Logos of God, we 
understand this primarily from the 
perspective of the universe’s creation and 
its further articulation by human beings. 
When we say that the universe as the 
Church is held hypostatically by Christ, 
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however, we understand this from the 
perspective of the Incarnation.  
By relating humanity to Christ, 
whose hypostasis, after the Pentecost, was 
transmitted to the Church, theology 
implicitly affirms the centrality of Christ-
event for our comprehension of how the 
knowledge of the universe as a whole (that 
is as “all in all”) is possible. It also affirms 
the cosmological significance of this event 
for the universe as such if the knowledge 
of the universe is treated as part of the 
created universe. Then one can conjecture 
that the development of the universe has, 
theologically speaking, a drastically  
different meaning before the Incarnation of 
the Logos on Earth, and, after it. 43  It was 
necessary for the universe to be in a state 
of constructive development in order to 
sustain life on Earth and to allow God to 
condescend to us and to assume human 
flesh in order to initiate the new stage of 
salvation history. This means, that nature, 
as it existed  before the incarnation (being 
lost in the sense, that it did not know its 
own Divine origin), was transfigured 
through the knowledge of its meaning and  
destiny which it received from man; for the 
acquisition of the ecclesial hypostasis 
through the building of the body of Christ 
leads human beings to the transfigured 
state, where the balance between their 
natural and hypostatic qualities should 
change in favour of the latter; the 
sustenance of  the natural dimensions of 
human existence, which has been  
conditioned by cosmological conditions, 
ceases probably to function as the 
precondition of the fulfilment of the divine 
plan. This confirms our conjecture that the 
constructive development of the universe 
as evolving towards the conditions where 
human beings could exist, had to take 
place only prior to the incarnation. After 
the Incarnation it is humanity that becomes 
fully responsible for the fate of the 
universe. Together with this theological 
argument one can reassert  that the 
universe in the future is not to be seen as 
anthropic in a physical sense, but its vision 
becomes more dependent on the condition 
of humanity. The matter of salvation of the 
universe  becomes an ecclesial activity of 
the transfiguration of nature and its 
unification back to God. Humanity then is 
not just a purpose of creation (that is that 
which was asserted by the some versions  
of the anthropic principle); it can only be 
understood in the context of the  promise 
of God for its salvation as  constituting the 
locus point of the meeting of God and His 
creation, as the mediating agency whose 
purpose is to bring the whole universe 
through its genuine knowledge to the new 
creation.44  
 
Conclusion: Transfiguration of the 
Universe through Deified Knowledge  
Orthodox theology, by asserting a priestly 
role of humanity with respect to the whole 
creation implies that the entire universe is 
to be transfigured through being brought 
back to union with God. What is the 
meaning of this assertion in view of 
present-day perception of the actual 
infinity of the universe? Cosmology 
explicitly states that the physical universe 
is huge and that humanity effectively sees 
the frozen image of its past reaching us 
through light travelling billions of years. 
The universe at large is causally 
disconnected and most of its space will 
never be reached physically. In this sense 
any analogy with the theologically asserted 
transfiguration of the Earthly nature, which 
sometimes is invoked in the context of 
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ecological concerns, has no sense. The 
language of “use” or “development” of 
nature, which needs humanity for its 
transfiguration must be abandoned as 
irrelevant in application to the universe as 
a whole, if one aims to avoid a suspicion in 
producing pseudo-scientific mythology.  
When we speak of “en-hypostasiszing” the 
universe we mean that this has something 
to do with the humanity’s quality as 
“hypostasis of the universe”, that is being 
able to articulate the universe and make it 
palpable. It is not a matter of “shaping” the 
universe into a human product, but of 
bringing it into a conscious relationship 
with God. And humanity does this through 
understanding the universe’s meaning in 
its connection and unity with the 
primordial ground of the Logos. In other 
words, to grasp the meaning of the 
universe in the context of its unity, means 
to reveal this unity as that one which 
proceeds from God. Thus to understand the 
universe means to understand it through 
relationship with God. Correspondingly 
such an understanding implies that its very 
process within the limits of the human 
nature is subjected to participation in the 
Divine activity. Maximus the Confessor 
anticipated such an understanding when he 
argued that the mind lacks the power to 
gain a “scientific” sense of reality because 
it does not grasp how the manifold of the 
universe is related  to God.  The issue of 
such a relationship is a longstanding 
theological problem and we do not discuss 
it here. The only thing we would like to 
mention is that in order to reconcile God’s 
transcendence and His presence in the 
world, one usually makes a distinction 
between divine essence and its activity: 
God differs radically according to essence 
and is identical according to activity. As 
we argued elsewhere, this subtle 
distinction in relationship can be expressed 
through the language of hypostatic 
inherence (obviously, it cannot be tracked 
on the level of the worldly causality) 
whose pointers can be detected through the 
study of the universe (Nesteruk  2004, pp. 
169-83). The detection of the Divine 
presence in the world presupposes 
participation in the Divine which takes 
place on different levels of reality by 
understanding, intellection, sensibility, 
coordination in rubrics of space and time 
and other aspects of life.45 And to secure 
the transcendence of the Divine, such a 
participation implies a change not of 
human nature, but a mode of being, an 
acquisition of such a new hypostasis which 
would allow  the natural cognitive faculties 
to function in a modified state when the 
vision of the universe in its extended 
spatiality and temporality is transformed 
towards its theogenic uniformity, that is 
unity in God.   
 Since all talks about participation 
in the Divine have sense in the context of 
Christ being the ultimate archetype of this 
participation, it seems plausible to make an 
epistemological analogy  with some of 
Christ’s activities which manifested the 
presence of the Divine mode of being 
within his fully human nature.  As an 
example, we consider His walking on the 
water, in analogy with T. Tollefsen’s line 
of thought, adjusting it for the purposes of 
our reasoning (Tollefsein 2008, p. 211). To 
walk is a human activity; to walk on the 
liquid and fragile surface of water shows 
that there is a double activity is involved, 
that is the human walking and the Divine 
activity which enables Christ to actualise a 
mode of being which transcends that 
which pertains to His human nature. What 
is obvious here is that the divine activity 
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penetrates into the human nature of Christ, 
but this nature is preserved in the sense 
that the logos of this nature is secured in 
God. What is changed is the “mode” of 
being, that is the way in which human 
nature exists and executes its natural 
functions. The presence of this “mode” of 
being indicates that humanity of Christ 
participated in the Divine activity, thus 
being deified.  Making  an analogy with 
the case of knowledge of the universe one 
can say, on the one hand, that to think and 
see things in the universe in its diastatic 
display is also a human activity; on the 
other hand,  if  a human being involved in 
the study of the universe, exercising their 
ability to see and comprehend the visible 
universe, subject themselves  to the 
actualisation in them a mode of being 
which transcends their human nature, so 
that the divine activity penetrates their 
human nature,46 while preserving it, they 
will be able to see the universe beyond that 
which is visible according to the capacity 
and delimiters originating  from his created 
nature. They think the universe as a whole, 
but their thought transcends discursive 
reasoning in contemplating the universe as 
the  unity held in Christ’s “right hand” 
(Rev. 1:16). This analogy receives it 
justification in the fact that Christ, being 
fully human, must have been subjected to 
the vision of the universe in its unity with 
God through enhypostasizing his human 
nature by the Logos in the same way as the 
whole universe is inherent in Him.   	  
 In a way, to see the universe as 
whole creation, that is to see it as an 
instant of the unconditional Divine Love 
with respect to the world, means to 
participate in the actually infinite mode of 
the Divine activity. To comprehend the 
universe as a whole as a “simultaneous” 
with the instant of the natural life, means 
to achieve the change of a mode of this 
life. Maximus describes this by saying that  
“such a one has no experience of what is 
present to it, and has become without 
beginning and end; he no longer bears 
within himself temporal life and his 
motions…”. In this, effectively deified 
condition, a human person acquires the 
vision of the universe through the “eyes” 
of the Logos Himself, for, according to 
Maximus, “he  possesses the sole divine 
and eternal life of the indwelling 
Word…”47 With all this, human nature is 
preserved and not destroyed. What is 
changed, is mode of being through 
interpenetration by God when the whole 
universe is perceived as the saturating “all 
in all” of inexpressible communion with 
Love. It is through this love that “cosmic 
homelessness”  (M. Heidegger and E. 
Fromm), “non-attunement with the 
universe” (J. F. Lyotard) and “alienation” 
from it (R. Ingarden), are overcome 
through love to that unconditional Love of  
Christ which is similar to that 
unconditional mother’s love to her children 
impressed on them through the saturating 
givenness of her smile (H. U. von 
Balthasar).  The universe becomes for us 
something greater and other than “only the 
universe”, because the specific “worldly” 
character of the universe is overcome 
without the universe itself being 
“removed” or “eliminated”. The 
meaninglessness of the universe, its pure 
factuality and impersonality, its 
indifference to the Divine truth, are also 
overcome. The universe is transfigured 
from within human contemplation and 
comprehension, but preserved in its 
naturalness. It is transfigured exactly to the 
extent the human person relieves itself 
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from the grief of living in it, when the 
sense of life in God and with God makes 
the entire rapidly expanding universe with 
myriads of scintillating stars no more than 
an instant of communion. The universe is 
transfigured because it is transcended. It 
transcended, but not abandoned. It is 
transcended in the direction of the inside of 
human person, that is towards 
strengthening and asserting that existence 
which is free as much as possible from the 
physical and biological, as well as social 
and historical necessities.   
 
 Such a freedom of thinking of the 
universe proceeds from the freedom of 
human beings made in the image of God. 
And it is this image becomes the “delimiter 
of free thinking” of the universe: all 
thoughts and articulations of the universe 
always contain in themselves the traces of 
the divine image. Even when cosmology 
proves the insignificance of humanity in 
the universe, the divine image remains 
exactly because human mind resists all 
attempts to be circumscribed by the rubrics 
of the natural, finite and transient. Human 
beings attempt to understand the 
underlying sense of beings and things not 
according to their “nature” (which is 
unfolded in the sciences) but according to 
the final causes of these beings and things 
in relation to the place and goals of 
humanity in creation. This understanding 
cannot be explicated only through physics 
and  biology. It is based in views on 
humanity as the crown of creation made in 
the image of God. And this is the reason 
why in a God-like fashion humanity wants 
to recognise all sorts of beings (either 
simple physical objects or living 
organisms) not according to their nature 
(as happens in scientific research) that is 
according to their compelling givenness, 
but as results of  humanity’s free will.48 
The image of eternity as a different mode 
of being retains in any cosmological theory 
created through free willing even if this 
theory predicts the finitude of all actual 
forms of existence and life. Free thinking 
of the universe is thinking of the freedom 
of the incarnate human person, brought 
into being in the Divine image by the   will 
of the Holy Spirit (Sakharov 1999, p. 171). 
    
 In conclusion one may quote 
Maximus the Confessor’s Mystagogy, 
where he characteristically confirms our 
thought that free thinking of the universe 
and an attempt to see it through the “eyes” 
of God corresponds to the destiny of 
humanity of bringing creation back into 
union with God:  
[…] when the world, as man, will die to its 
life of appearances and rise again renewed  
of its oldness in the resurrection expected 
presently […] the man who is ourselves 
will rise with the world as a part with the 
whole and the small with large, having 
obtained the power of not being subject to 
further corruption. Then the body will 
become like the soul and sensible things 
like intelligible things in dignity and glory, 
for the unique divine power will manifest 
itself in all things in a vivid and active 
presence proportioned to each one, and 
will by itself preserve unbroken for endless 
ages the bond of unity [ET: (Berthold 
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18 One can invoke a famous Aristotelian objection to existence of a void beyond the cosmos on the grounds of 
the counter arguments to Cleomedes who suggested that the whole cosmos could be shifted as a whole. 
According to Aristotle the logical difficulty would be exactly in the choice of the direction of movement: why 
should the cosmos move in this direction rather than that, and why should it stop here rather than there? 
(Aristotle, Physics, 4.8, 215a1). In modern terms this can be described as if the preexistent space would be 
uniform: the uniformity makes devoid of any sense questioning the absolute position of the cosmos since all 
locations are equivalent, so that the location of he cosmos could be described in terms of “everywhere” and 
“nowhere”.  
 
19 It is interesting to note that the first ‘scientific’ ideas on the origination of the universe in pre-existent space 
and time were proposed by Newton who intended to reconcile the Biblical account of creation, where the world 
had to have a beginning, with his view that time could have neither beginning nor end. Newton asserted that the 
visible universe was brought into existence by God in the past which is separated from us by finite time, but this 
took place within the absolute and infinite space and time. The creation of matter in Newton’s model is detached 
from the creation of time. One sees here a fundamental difference not only with the contemporary views based 
on General Relativity, where space and time are relational upon matter  but even with Maximus the Confessor 
for whom space and time where inseparable elements of the creaturely nature of the world (Balthasar 2003, p. 
139). 
 
20 I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A 426-427/ B454-455.  
 
21 In modern cosmology such an interpretation corresponds to different models of the multiverse. It has also 
particular connotations with Penrose’s suggestion that the special initial conditions of our universe  responsible 
for arrow of time in it, are set up from outside through choosing them out of many other possibilities, which 
could lead to different universes; see (Penrose 2005, pp. 726-32).  
 
22Ambigiua 7 [PG 91, 1081A],  [This ET: (Blowers, Wilken 2003, pp. 56-7)]. 
 
23 See details in (Thunberg 1995, pp. 50-55). 
 
24Ambigua 41  [PG 91, 1312B]. [This ET: Louth, Op. cit.  p. 160.] 
 
25  (Thunberg 1995, p. 401). C.f.  Centuries on Charity 3.28: “We affirm that the divine substance alone has 
nothing contrary,  since its is eternal and infinite and bestows eternity on all the rest. The substance of things, 
however, has not-being as contrary” [ET: (Sherwood  1955, p. 178)]. 
 
26 See more on this in (Nesteruk 2008, pp. 250-54). More details can be found in (Nesteruk 2012[1], 2012[2]). 
 
27 One must make a distinction between the  knowledge of the presence of the principles of creation (i.e. the 
logoi), i.e. that there are the logoi which hold the creation on the one hand, and the contemplation of the logoi as 
a special stage of an advanced spiritual development. For if the former is probably accessible to the discursive 
reason, through  scientific research, for example, the latter requires one to have made an advance in religious 
contemplation, which is rather sustained by one's participation in ecclesial life.  Definitely when both the 
knowledge of the existence of the logoi and their contemplation are combined in one human person, science can 
be said to participate in the contemplation of the logoi of creation.  
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28 Avoiding a long discussion on whether the Incarnation was caused by the Fall, or the opposite, that the 
hypostatic union of God and man was the eternal fulfillment of the will of God (see (Nellas 1997, pp. 34-42, 94-
96), or a more recent discussion in (Bugur, 2008), our position is that since the universe and human beings 
themselves were enhypostasized by the Logos, so that humanity was capable of  making room for its Archetype, 
that is the incarnate Logos, the creation of the universe out of nothing must have been effected in view of the 
mystery of Christ and his kind to be an instrument of the Incarnation and perfecting the Divine image. (See 
Maximus the  Confessor, Ad Thalassium 60 [PG 90, 621A]). 
 
29  Maximus the Confessor, Scholia on the Divine Names (of Dionysisos the Areopagite) [PG 4. 321 B], [ET: 
(Yannaras 2005. p. 63), emphasis added]. 
 
30 The foreseeing by God means that all creation is in a state of existence which has as an implanted aspect of 
being subordinated to this foreseeing. For humanity the revelation of this goes through what E. Husserl called in 
the 20th century “marvelous teleologies” which lead consciousness to the transcendent idea of God. Unlike 
Maximus, Husserl subjected this idea to his phenomenological reduction thus putting it within the sphere of 
subjectivity with no ontological reference. However the way of ascent to the ide of God was similar to what 
Maximus was advocating in the last quotation: the power of God’s foreseeing is contemplated by human beings 
through observing teleologies in nature. 
 
31 Compare with the unity of all humanity in the Church in Maximus the Confessor’s Mystagogy 1.  
 
32 The intuition of fullness of humanity through ages of time, that is of all generations of humans who ever lived 
is formulated in  the idea of  fulfilment of  pleroma of humanity, that is  of the fullness of the  “body” of 
humanity in Christ. Gregory of Nyssa argues that when the Holy Scripture says “God created man according to 
His image and likeness”, it does mean “…the entire plentitude  of humanity was included by God of all, by His 
power of foreknowledge, as it were in one body…The whole race was spoken of as one man… Our whole 
nature, then, extending from the first to the last, is, so to say, one image of Him Who is.” (Gregory of Nyssa, On 
the Making of Man, 17 [ET: NPNF, vol. 5, p. 406 (emphasis added)]. See also (Ladner 1958, pp. 82). The fact 
that for its fulfilment  pleroma of humanity in its fallen state needs time and generations of procreation, indicates  
that on the one hand, all human beings (including those who lived before the Incarnation) are created in the 
image of God; on the other hand if one thinks about the fulfilment of pleroma of humanity  as some event in the 
future,  one thinks of the ecclesial catholicity as an eschatological objective of the whole movement of creation 
towards its transfigured state in God.  
 
33 Whatever mode of understanding related to analogies of experience cosmology uses, it places its subject 
matter in rubrics of time which, according to Kant, guarantees the unity of experience (Kant, Critique of Pure 
Reason, A 177/B 219-220). 
 
34 See in this respect (Barrow, Tipler 1988, pp. 258-76). 
 
35 [ET: (Berthold 1985, p. 196). Emphasis added]. 
 
36 Christian Orthodox cosmology makes it explicit that it is cosmic history that is understood as part of the 
human history, that is the history of salvation, and not vice versa. Correspondingly one can say that  it is human 
history which manifest itself as a centre of disclosure and manifestation of cosmic history. The assertion of 
Orthodox theological cosmology that that cosmic history is included in the history of salvation is a very strong 
aspect of the theological commitment in the dialogue between modern cosmology and theology for it is assumed 
here that man is  not only the natural microcosm, but that man at this stage of the history of salvation determines 
the fate and future of the universe. This conviction entails not only  geocentism, related to the planet Earth as 
that place  where humanity was initiated, but also a spiritual anthropocentrism related to hypostatic existence, 
from within which  one assert the existence of the universe as effected articulated words about reality. When it is 
affirmed that humanity is hypostasis of the universe (see (Clément 1976, p. 91), it is pointed towards Christ as 
the incarnate Logos, in the hypostasis of whom the universe as well as man exist. In this sense the geocentrism 
and anthropocentrism of Christian cosmology, means its Christocentrism for it is here on the planet Earth that 
the meeting of the Divine and human, uncreated and created  took place, and it is because of this that Earth is 
spiritually central as that place from which the disclosure and manifestation of the sense of the created universe 
takes place. 
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37 This ambiguity of the human position in the universe constitutes a matter of what modern philosophy names as 
“the paradox of the human subjectivity in the world” (See a detailed discussion of this paradox in (Nesteruk 
2008, pp. 174-84). Maximus the Confessor anticipated this paradox:  “As a compound of soul and body he [man] 
is limited essentially by intelligible and sensible realities, while at the same time he himself defines [articulates] 
these realities through his capacity to apprehend intellectually and perceive with his senses.” (Ambigua, 10:26 
[PG 91, 1153B], [ET: The Philokalia, v. 2, p. 277]. See an alternative translation in (Louth 1996,  p. 124)].  
 
 37 For Maximus, however,  the dichotomy, present in this affirmation   was not a problem, for according to his 
theological position the fundamental non-locality which is present in human insight about the universe originates 
from the human ability to comprehend the intelligible realm which contains ideas about the universe as a whole. 
However, because  man did not fulfil his task  the unity of all creation through the mediation of man is only 
present in the human condition as a potentiality. 
 
38 The importance of which has been highlighted by (Torrance 1997). 
 
39 Origen, Contra Celsum, IV [ET: (Bettenson1969, p. 213)]. 
 
40 Origen, Contra Celsum, I.277 [ET:  (Chadwick 1953, p. 187)]. 
 
41 Athanasius, On the Incarnation, 8 [ET: 1996, p. 33]. 
 
42 ET: (Berthold 1985, p. 188).  
 
43 C.f. with a similar division in Maximus: “Therefore we may divide time into two parts according to its design, 
and we may distinguish both the ages pertaining to the mystery of the Incarnation of the Divine, and the ages 
concerning the deification of the human by grace…and to say it concisely: both those ages which concern the 
descent of God to men, and those which have begun the ascent of men to God…Or, to say in even better, the 
beginning, the middle, and the end of all ages, those which have gone by, those of the present time, and those 
which are yet to come, is our Lord Jesus Christ” [PG 90, 320B-C], [This ET: (Florovsky 1976, pp. 169-70]. 
 
44 The fact that this knowledge can be different in comparison with ordinary knowledge is not just a matter of 
speech. The renewal  of knowledge (metanoia) while human beings acquire their ecclesial hypostasis leads to  
the development of a new conciliatory and thanksgiving intentionality and thus to the change of its noematic 
correlate, so that the “content” of knowledge, the strategy of exploration of the world and its necessity is driven 
by the saving telos  of humanity in building the Body of Christ making thus the universe by that which has been 
called “new creation”.  
 
45 Maximus the Confessor, Ambigua 7 [PG 91, 1080 B-C]. 
 
46 Maximus the Confessor, Chapters on Knowledge, 2.21 [PG 90, 1133D]. 
 
47 Ambigua 10 [PG 91, 1144C], [ET: (Louth 1996, p. 116)].  
 
48 The analogy comes from  St. Maximus the Confessor’s discussion on whether God knows created things 
according to their nature. His answer is negative: God knows things according to his will: “…when Christians 
were asked by some outsiders puffed up with their learning, how they can claim God knows existent things…and 
that he knows intellectual being intellectually and sensible things sensibly, they replied that he neither knows 
sensible things sensibly nor intellectual things intellectually. For it is out of question that the one who is beyond 
existent things should know things in the manner proper to beings. But we say that God knows existent things as 
the products of his own acts of will…” (Ambigua 7 [PG 91, 1085B], [ET: (Blowers 2003, pp. 61-2)  (emphasis 
added)]). 
